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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Gimp Anthropology: 
Non-Apparent Disabilities and Navigating the Social 
 
by 
 
R. Janice Orlando 
 
 
Individuals with non-apparent, physical disabilities face unique social challenges 
from those that are encountered by the more visibly disabled. The absence of visible cues 
indicating physical impairment causes ambiguity in social situations, leaving the sufferer 
vulnerable to moral judgments and social sanctions when they are unable to embody and 
perform to cultural norms. This dynamic generates a closeted status that the individual 
must learn to navigate. Using Eve Sedgwick's "The Epistemology of the Closet," this 
paper deploys auto-ethnography, traditional ethnographic techniques, and literature 
reviews to illuminate a third space of functioning between the outwardly 'healthy' and the 
visibly disabled.  
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PREFACE 
On Terminology 
 
 
Before beginning my analysis, it would perhaps be prudent to address a few 
comments toward some of the terminology that I will frequently be employing; these 
include some main terms in my title, ―Gimp Anthropology: Non-Apparent Disabilities 
and Navigating the Social.‖  I use the phrase ‗non-apparent disabilities‘ to denote a 
category in opposition to visible disabilities, which are sometimes referred to as 
‗handicaps,‘ in popular parlance. ‗Invisibly disabled‘ or 'nonvisible disabled' are phrases 
that have been commonly used in academic studies and articles, but are nevertheless 
problematic terms because many people with non-apparent disabilities, myself included, 
have questioned the extent to which our personal health struggles are completely 
undetectable, if only one were paying attention.  
Similarly, the term ‗hidden disabilities‘ gives off the impression that some sort of 
sleight of hand is taking place – which incorporates an additional layer of judgment in 
addition to the impact of social failure arising from one‘s physical impairment not 
registering on one‘s outward appearance. And in fact, ‗non-apparent‘ should really 
perhaps be not immediately apparent, as many chronically ill individuals tire quickly in 
social situations or frequently betray their fatigue or pain in their comportment. Finally, 
where possible I choose to say that a person has a non-apparent disability rather than 
using the noun-phrase ―the non-apparent disabled,‖ not only because of the violence it 
does to the English language, but more importantly that it tends to create a false picture 
of the totally disabled person – as if every faculty was profoundly disabled in every way 
– an inert human being.  
 
 
The word ‗gimp‘ is a piece of derogatory slang, originating in the United States. It 
has several meanings. The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Slang 
1
 offers the following 
definitions:  
 gimp
1 – noun   Courage, guts.  
 gimp
2 –  noun  1. A lame person or leg 
          verb intr.  2. To limp, hobble 
 gimp
3— noun  A stupid or contemptible person 
 
And, for slightly more ethnographic purposes, the top-voted result for ‗gimp‘ on the 
popular reference website Urban Dictionary 
2
: 
(1) A derrogatory [sic] term for someone that is disabled or has a medicial [sic] 
problem that results in physical impairment.  
 
(2) An insult implying that someone is incompetent, stupid, etc. Can also be used 
to imply that the person is uncool or can‘t/won‘t do what everyone else is 
doing.  
 
 
My usage of ‗gimp‘ does several things. Firstly I want to call attention to the fact 
that I, an anthropologist, personally suffer with a non-apparent disability; it is variously 
                                                          
1
 John Ayto and John Simpson, ―gimp1 noun,‖ Oxford Dictionary of Modern Slang, Oxford Reference 
Online (Oxford University Press), Rice University, accessed April 7, 2012, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.rice.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t291.e1757 
John Ayto and John Simpson, ―gimp2 noun,‖ Oxford Dictionary of Modern Slang, Oxford Reference Online 
(Oxford University Press), Rice University, accessed April 7, 2012, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.rice.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t291.e1758 
John Ayto and John Simpson, ―gimp3 noun,‖ Oxford Dictionary of Modern Slang, Oxford Reference Online 
(Oxford University Press), Rice University, accessed April 7, 2012, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.rice.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t291.e1759 
 
2
 Pymp, November 1, 2003, ―gimp,‖ Urban Dictionary, accessed April 7, 2012, 
<http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Gimp> 
 
 
called Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), Chronic Fatigue and Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (CFIDS), or Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (ME). Later in my analysis I will 
discuss how diagnostic labels change depending upon gender, geopolitical location, and 
physician – but for now it is vital that I immediately call attention to my own 
positionality 
3
 as ‗native‘ ethnographer, or perhaps more accurately - that I am deploying 
autoethnography.  
Secondly, I am writing about the struggles of individuals who must suffer, often 
silently, not only with physical, emotional, and mental distress, but also with the constant 
moral judgments that are imposed upon them as they simply try to navigate their 
everyday social lives. Because of this, in using the term 'gimp' I wish to make a gesture 
toward the history of subordinated groups reclaiming once-denigrating terms. ‗Queer‘ 
comes specifically to mind; the reasons for this will become clearer later, but it is related 
to my main point: that there is a third space of functioning between the healthy/disabled 
binary, and it is this space that I am trying to illuminate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 For a cogent discussion of the concept of positionality as seen through the lenses of Heidegger and 
Gadamer, see Allaine Cerwonka and Liisa H. Malki, Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in 
Ethnographic Fieldwork (University of Chicago Press, 2007), 25-33. 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It‘s the person as resource base and maximization is the goal – through 
education, through investment, through all these different modalities to 
continuously maximize potential – that I think is what‘s emerging as a 
model of the person in the world. There are enormously disturbing 
things about that, not the least of which is the extent to which it cuts off 
whole sectors of the population from even participating because it‘s so 
costly. It‘s very easy to think about this in terms of Darwinian fitness. 
Wherever the cutoff point is, that‘s where it has to be, you know. 4 
      -Emily Martin  
 
 
  
 When I was around 15 years of age, I had what I thought at the time was a 
horrible case of Mono. For months I spent most of my days in bed; I could stagger 
sometimes to the living room couch, spending time with my family but yearning to go 
back to bed. Muscles became weak, mind foggy, mood dismal. Blood tests showed no 
evidence of any mononucleosis having ever been in my system. Several confused general 
practitioners and a pediatric rheumatologist later, I had a diagnosis of Fibromyalgia 
Syndrome (FMS). Sixteen years old and I was in physical therapy over what I had 
initially thought was a bad cold. At first, I'd had the unfortunately common, but 
nonetheless still unpleasant, experience of having a doctor dismiss my symptoms as 
depression. 
                                                          
4
 Suzanna R. Kirchner, "From Flexible Bodies to Fluid Minds: An Interview with Emily Martin," Ethos 
27.3 (1999): 269. 
2 
 
 Finally as time progressed and I approached adulthood, I began to be taken 
seriously. It helped that I‘d been taking a college class at the local community college. 
That seemed to catch a doctor‘s interest. Clearly I was a go-getter, so something must be 
holding me back. Finally, nearly 10 years after my initial diagnosis of FMS, I began to be 
treated for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), and started to experience some real relief 
from my symptoms. My doctor is an expert on the immune system who treats 
predominantly AIDS patients and people with chronic illnesses like CFS or FMS. The 
two categories of illness have significant overlap in that immune system dysfunction is a 
hallmark of both, a discovery that came out of AIDS research and which has benefited 
people with CFS. With new etiological hypotheses come new blood tests, and even 
thought I didn't entirely understand what was being measured, I nevertheless experienced 
a validation of my symptoms, through quantifiable biomedical tests, for the first time.  
 It was a long journey to reach this place. Not only have scientists discovered more 
information about chronic illnesses, which is also undoubtedly the case, but also doctors 
have slowly, ever so slowly, awakened to the possibility that patients are not making 
themselves ill. Almost the first thing that you learn from having a non-apparent, disabling 
chronic illness is that doctors are varied and fallible. Previously, you might have assumed 
(as I did, I confess) that because all doctors must meet a certain objective threshold of 
skill, achievement and knowledge, that therefore when each are presented with the same 
set of symptoms and test results most doctors would logically reach the same sort of 
conclusions. This is an enormous fallacy that becomes almost instantly apparent. The lore 
of the stigmatized, as Goffman (1963) notes, is full of war stories; the chronically ill 
often swap their tales of doctor's appointments gone horribly, horribly wrong. One of my 
3 
 
interlocutors described 10 years of being written off as depressed, until finally, in 
desperation, they enlisted a roommate of 3 months to come 'testify' to the doctor that they 
didn't consider their friend depressed. It finally worked; the person was diagnosed and 
treated for CFS and a sleep disorder. After ten years of angst and frustration.  
 It‘s an especially cruel mechanism that drives a person, already plagued with 
miserable new symptoms, so far down that they start to wonder, 'Am I really causing 
this? I don‘t want continuous pain, awful sleep, muscle weakness… I don't suffer because 
I need attention. What good is a pat on the shoulder and a ‗feel better‘ to the ability to run 
outside or play on a skateboard?'  (This is what I wondered when I was 15, anyway.) 
Everyone with a chronic illness has to go through this stage: when the doctors, the 
culture, your peers – when everyone says "you can do it, you can (make yourself) feel 
better." But you really, just, can't. Much more than a mere capacity to empathize with 
another's bodily suffering – this experience cements a knowledge that, once ‗earned,‘ 
gives you an acute awareness of what it might be like to be that other person struggling 
with their chronic illness. Levels of disability differ, perhaps someone else isn‘t quite 
disabled (and hopefully won‘t be), the symptoms and their intensities are not the same – 
but this particular experience is a common one. It is on the level of the social, not the 
biological, this suffering. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Non-Apparent Disabilities & Navigating the Social 
 
 
 
 Individuals with non-apparent, physical disabilities face unique social challenges 
from those that are encountered by the more visibly disabled. The absence of visible cues 
indicating physical impairment causes ambiguity in social situations, leaving the sufferer 
vulnerable to moral judgments and social sanctions when they are unable to embody and 
perform to cultural norms. This dynamic generates a closeted status that the individual 
must learn to navigate. Using Eve Sedgwick's (1990) "The Epistemology of the Closet," 
this paper deploys autoethnography, traditional ethnographic techniques, and literature 
reviews to illuminate a third space of functioning between the outwardly 'healthy' and the 
visibly disabled.  
 Structurally, each chapter in this paper seeks to explore one facet of this third 
space: 1)  living not only with near-constant discomfort but also with personal and 
identity delegitimation due to the "epistemological purgatory" 
5
 of their health status; 2) 
claiming the authority of one's own "illness narrative," 
6
 even as experts actively engage 
in undermining it; and finally 3) the closeted mechanisms of managing stigma and 
identity in social settings and interactions. The first chapter, "The Epistemology of Non-
Apparent Disabilities," seeks to ground the category by differentiating a group of 
"contested illnesses" from among the larger category of potentially disabling, non-
                                                          
5
 Kristin Barker, "Self-Help Literature and the Making of an Illness Identity: The Case of Fibromyalgia 
Syndrome (FMS)," Social Problems 49.3 (2002): 279-300. 
6
 Arthur Kleinman, The Illness Narratives: suffering, healing, and the human condition (Basic Books, 
1998). 
5 
 
apparent illnesses, thus focusing the scope of the argument. Contested illnesses are 
―diseases and conditions that engender major scientific disputes and extensive public 
debates over environmental causes‖ (Brown, et al. 2001:236). This unstable biomedical 
ground  denies sufferers not only treatments which may reduce the frequency or intensity 
of symptoms, but also withholds from them the means to make their illness experiences 
intelligible to others (Shriver & Waskul 2006; Dawes 1991; Kleinman 1992).  In 
addition, many contested chronic illnesses, such as CFS or FMS, are overwhelmingly 
gendered as female (Åsbring & Narvanen 2002; Pheby 1999; Prins 2006); this 
discourages men from seeking treatment and may also bias doctors and thereby 
contribute to under-diagnosis in men.  This generates an incredible amount of stress in 
addition to learning how to function with new health challenges, to say nothing of the 
impact on personal identity and hopes or goals for the future (Bury 1982; Charmaz 1995; 
Clarke & James 2003).  
 Finally, when a person has reached the threshold of disability, the stigma that 
comes with embracing the label is supposed to be mitigated, at least in part, by the 
political and institutional mechanisms set in place for the disabled. However, the political 
goals of the disability community at large have been highly skewed toward a paradigm of 
the non-chronically ill, predictably impaired, "healthy disabled" (Wendell 2001, 1996).  
Accommodations for wheelchair use or technology to mitigate hearing and sight 
impairments are fairly straight forward measures which, due to the hard work of 
disability advocates, have become nearly a given in most institutional and work settings 
within the United States. Thus the majority of accommodations processes currently in 
place are designed with such impairments in mind, and individuals with non-apparent 
6 
 
disabilities are forced to work much harder to negotiate for accommodations which may 
be more relevant to their needs (Jung 2002). 
 Chapter 2 addresses the intimidating challenges which face individuals who are 
struggling to assert their voice as authentic and authoritative when sharing their personal 
illness narratives. Unequal power relations fostered by a discrepancy in credentials and 
expertise can work against individuals trying to stake claims to personal truths. One of 
these scenarios is a well-documented one: when patients are speaking (or trying to speak) 
to their physicians. Patriarchal cultural norms shape the doctor-patient encounter. 
Ironically, in the quest to unpack this dynamic, academic analysts have sometimes 
inadvertently re-challenged the authority of the speaking patient. These experts, while 
speaking eloquently on the plight of the subordinated, often end up deploying the 
authority of their own expertise to speak on behalf of  the Other rather than affirming 
their right to speak for themselves. The critical biomedical discourse that speaks against 
the 'medicalization' or 'reification of illness' is a prime example; by denying an individual 
the agency and capability to understand, define, and describe his or her own suffering, 
this discourse constructs a particularly devastating challenge to personal illness 
narratives. 
7
 
 Having attended to the epistemological grounds of non-apparent disabilities, the 
devastating effects that they have on an individual due to constantly changing bodily 
challenges, and the obstacles that often seek to undermine or confound their ability to 
claim them, it is time to put these lived experiences into a conceptual framework. 
                                                          
7
 For a useful overview of  feminist and other critical medical theories see Deborah Lupton, "Foucault and 
the medicalisation critique," in Foucault: Health and Medicine, Alan Petersen and Robin Bunton, eds., 
(London: Routledge, 1997): 94-112. 
7 
 
Because the stigma in this case is not immediately visible, it puts the stigmatized in the 
category of the "discreditable" (Goffman 1963:4). As such, the management of 
information becomes a central pivot point in social interactions. The dynamics of living 
with a non-apparent disability suggests a fruitful engagement with the concept of the 
queer "closet." After first tempering the framework with an evaluation of the usefulness 
and weaknesses of this analytic comparison, I will use the work of Goffman and 
Sedgwick, along with personal insights from key informants, to explore the pitfalls and 
double-binds that are seemingly inherent in the management of identities both queer and 
non-apparent disabled, alone and combined. 
  
 
Models and Methodologies 
  
 
 Clearly this thesis is one project with a definite autoethnographic flavor, as I 
personally have a non-apparent disability. But far from being an indulgent project of self-
absorption, an accusation leveled against many autoethnographies, 
8
 I very much 
hesitated to write on this subject. My undergraduate degree is in East Asian Studies and 
Languages and it was my intention to take my language skills and interests in Media 
Anthropology and go off to Japan and South Korea for the doing of fieldwork. 
9
 But as it 
                                                          
8
 See especially Geertz 1988; and Rosaldo 1993. 
9
 As Marcus (1998) attests, this type of ethnographic endeavor is regarded within the discipline as a much 
more traditional 'First Project.' 
8 
 
turns out, the idea that I could, with my chronic illness always in tow, traipse off across 
the globe alone – without the support system of my family and friends – was rather over-
ambitious.  
 Despite this rude awakening, I understood that my dual position as a scholar-in-
training and a chronically ill, disabled person was rather unique; and while mostly 
exasperating (for my department too, I suspect), this position that I have found myself in 
presented a good opportunity, maybe even an obligation, to try and turn a setback into a 
means of contributing an analysis that could potentially help to illuminate the mysterious 
world of a people who must learn to navigate their lives by a third mode of functioning. 
Neither 'healthy' nor 'visibly disabled,' they live their lives with non-apparent disabilities. 
 Nor am I the first scholar to write an analysis deeply influenced by her own 
experiences. While finishing up her dissertation research, Susan DiGiacomo was 
diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease;  reflecting on her challenges through ethnography was 
a way for her to cope. She emphasized that writing about her experiences of suffering 
was not a way to cast herself as, using Susan Sontag's term, "the anthropologist as hero" 
10
  nor was she exerting herself in a bid to be ―at best self-absorbed and pretentious, and 
at worst nihilistic‖(DiGiacomo 1992:111). Neither was Emily Martin, who researched 
women's reproductive health even as she herself was pregnant; and then later, as she 
wrote an ethnography on Bipolar disorder, something that she personally suffers with. In 
an interview, Martin once reflected on how taboo it was in the discipline to write about 
personal topics, and she struggled with how to approach it in an ethnographically 
                                                          
10
 Susan Sontag, ―The Anthropologist as Hero,‖ in Claude Levi-Strauss: The Anthropologist as Hero, ed. E. 
N. Hayes and T. Hayes, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970 [1963]), 184-196.  
 
9 
 
rigorous way. Finally she came to the realization that, ―there‘s no trick here. There‘s no 
trick at all. All I have to do is…pay close attention to what people say and find it 
amazing‖ (Kirschner 1999:252).  
 So in order to prevent my analysis from being merely a generalization based upon 
my own experiences, in addition to literature review I will employ the more traditional 
ethnographic techniques of anonymous survey results along with insights gained from 
semi-structured and informal interviews. These strategies were employed to solicit 
reflections on what it's like to live with chronic illnesses, and to glean insights about the 
obstacles that the non-obviousness of their challenges pose to smoothly navigating 
through their social lives. I wrote an online survey entitled "Living with Non-Apparent 
Disabilities" and received 29 responses. (I have included the text of the survey in an 
appendix.) The survey link was posted, via the social networking site Facebook, to two 
public pages run by activist/advocacy groups that center around awareness for people 
living with invisible disabilities.
11
  Additionally, from among my acquaintances I selected 
two key informants for interviews; one of these people I know in person, and the other is 
someone I know primarily from exchanges through online social networking. 
12
 
 Methodologically, I drew a line between my family, close friends and my 
interlocutors. Though I have quite a number of family, friends, and colleagues each living 
their lives with disabling chronic illnesses, I chose to view them as part of my intimate 
social network –and thus part of my autoethnographic sources of knowledge. My support 
networks are what keep me going, and what shape and give form to my ideas about my 
                                                          
11
 Their term. 
12
 As Nikolas Rose and Carlos Nuvos have pointed out, the internet is a facilitator of "digital bio-
citizenship" (2005:442). Luckily for me, they were right. 
10 
 
own life with chronic illnesses and of others as well.  And who is to say that my own 
experience is anything like another‘s?  As an American middle-class, single, young (late 
20s) white woman, I know better than to try and generalize from my own position. 
Instead, following Cerwonka and Malkki (2007), I have chosen to deploy my specific 
"vantage point," meaning that I purposefully use the fact that I occupy a particular  
"sociohistorical location" and have my own set of "priorities, questions, [and] hypotheses 
that one inevitably brings to bear in trying to understand an object or phenomenon‖ (26).  
 But this is not to assert that all autoethnographies or autoethnographically-
informed projects are necessarily analytically equal. I found Anderson's (2006) essay, 
"Analytic Autoethnography," to be a useful overview of different autoethnographic 
strategies and critiques; he proposes a general framework for how to construct an 
analytically rich autoethnographic analysis. In contradistinction to the 'evocative 
autoethnography' model, which seeks primarily to evoke an emotional response in the 
reader,
13
 Anderson champions his formulation of the "analytic autoethnography." It 
requires three elements: that the researcher be "a full member in the research group or 
setting," that this fact be made visible, and lastly that the researcher is "committed to 
developing theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena" (373).  The chosen 
exemplar of this species of autoethnography is the excellent work of Robert Murphy in 
his book The Body Silent (1987). Murphy wrote about his body's slow transformation into 
a state of quadriplegia due to a growing tumor. Incredibly personal while also analytically 
rich, Murphy's work ―forcefully demonstrates that deeply personal and self-observant 
                                                          
13
 See for instance the works of Carolyn Ellis and Arthur Bochner. 
11 
 
ethnography can rise above idiographic particularity to address broader theoretical 
issues‖ (Anderson 2006:379). 
 In any case, as many scholars have pointed out, there is no such thing as an 
ethnography without bias;
 14
 making evaluative judgments on research materials, the 
statements of interlocutors, and the narrative or theoretical strategies used to frame them 
are all situated practices: ―To say that understanding is always a situated practice is not 
simply to acknowledge that we always bring personal ‗bias‘ (conceptual and personal 
fore-understandings and prejudgments) to our research. It is to say that we always 
understand through a set of priorities and questions that we bring to the 
phenomenon/object we are researching‖ (Cerwonka & Malkki 2007:28). While not 
taking myself as the center of analysis, I want to especially draw attention to the fact that 
my own experiences both social and embodied have influenced the questions that I ask, 
and how I evaluate and derive meaning from the answers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Among the most impactful of these has been Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, 
eds. James Clifford and George Marcus, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
12 
 
CHAPTER 1 
The Epistemology of Non-Apparent Disabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 Non-apparent disabilities come in many forms and varieties, but their key 
underlying characteristics, for analytical purposes,  is that they 1) induce bodily suffering 
that interferes with the functioning of everyday life 
15
 and 2) do not immediately register 
on an individual's outward appearance. However, this definition is still over-broad; it still 
covers various cognitive, behavioral, or mental conditions (such as ADD/ADHD, 
Bipolar, etc.), auto-immune conditions (Lymes disease, Lupus, Celiac, Crohns), 
rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, multiple sclerosis (MS), and what I will call "contested 
illnesses," also referred to as diagnoses of exclusion. These include Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome (CFS)/Myalgic Encephalomyelitus (ME), Fibromyalgia (FM or FMS), and 
Gulf War Syndrome or Gulf War Related Illnesses (GWRIs) (Shriver & Waskul, 2006; 
Brown, et al. 2001). Because I aim to illuminate the particular social dimensions of living 
with non-apparent disabilities, my analysis will still to some extent apply to all of the 
above categories, but it is these last cluster of so-called contested illnesses that I am 
particularly interested in. 
16
 
 There are several reasons for this. First, their fraught epidemiological status 
means that there is constant confusion and uncertainty over possible causes, treatments, 
and even which 'proper' diagnostic nomenclature should be used. Second, when this 
                                                          
15
 Here I am borrowing from the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) 
16
 For a necessarily verbose but elegant discussion that, while also attending to the unique challenges faced 
by people with "invisible disabilities," still  manages to incorporate the different valences of disability, see 
N. Ann Davis, "Invisible Disability," Ethics 116.1 (2005): 153-213. 
13 
 
shaky biomedical grounding is coupled with the nature of these illnesses as chronic 
illnesses, which can be cyclical and fluctuate over time, we can see why they are 
particularly suited to an analysis of cultural norms and social friction; bodies with such 
illnesses fail to be flexible and productive in a socially valued way (Martin 1994). These 
illnesses are constitutively different from what Western society more commonly 
(mis)understands as the nature of disability – that they are both predictable and 
consistently visible. Third, despite the not insignificant existence of male sufferers, these 
illnesses are overwhelming gendered as female in both research literature and popular 
belief.  Finally, and not unimportantly, these illnesses are the ones that I am more 
intimately familiar with, as my own bodily suffering has been both popularly and 
diagnostically classified as belonging to this category.  
   
 
CFS/CFIDS/ME; FMS; GWRIs 
 
 The act of naming contested illnesses is a politically charged one with far-
reaching implications for health policy, physicians, and most importantly sufferers. 
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, as it is known in the United States, got its name from the 
predominant symptom of a mysterious mononucleosis-like illness that struck the 
residents of Lake Tahoe, Nevada in 1984 (Holmes, et al., 1987). However, Evengård et 
al. (2011) connected the possible origins of CFS to a much older malady termed 
"neurasthenia" by a 19th century American neurologist (Beard, 1869). Because doctors 
14 
 
were scrambling to find evidence of a pathogen or other cause, and because it initially 
was thought to occur predominantly among Caucasian middle or upper-class women, for 
a time it was referred to laughingly as the 'yuppie flu' in the popular media. This 
stigmatizing label long haunted anyone who sought, or considering seeking, treatment for 
similar symptoms. Despite successful lobbying efforts, it wasn't only the medical 
community and the popular media that failed to take the situation seriously. In 1999 the 
United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) acknowledged that it had re-directed 
millions of dollars, dedicated by Congress for CFS research, to other projects. 
17
 Both 
CFS and FMS are still considered somewhat of a 'women's' disease, especially within the 
United States, but as I will argue later on, this may be due to sampling biases in research, 
varying and gendered health-seeking behaviors, the gendered assumptions of diagnosing 
physicians, and the stigma of possibly being diagnosed with a disease coded as feminine.   
 Though diagnostically CFS denotes a myriad of other symptoms, the name causes 
immediate confusion with Chronic Fatigue, also a diagnostic phrase. Chronic fatigue is a 
symptom that can be caused by any number of things, including many other illnesses, 
contested or otherwise, or simply from "modern living" (Beard, 1869). The word 
'syndrome' is itself embedded in a web of meanings. The choice of 'disease,' 'disorder,' 
and 'syndrome' has implications for both biomedical legitimacy and by extension where 
the malady is thought to fall on the West's recalcitrant mind/body paradigm. 'Syndrome' 
is a collection of symptoms with no known biological cause, and is frequently used in 
psychiatry. Former illnesses that later achieved biomedical legitimacy include AIDS 
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(acquired immune deficiency syndrome) and SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome). 
The phrase, 'Chronic Fatigue Syndrome' has been criticized by patients for its origins in 
psychiatric literature, and a 2004 survey confirmed overwhelmingly that CFS patients 
want the name to be changed (Jason et al., 2004). 
 Importantly for those suffering with CFS, the confusion between it and the 
symptom chronic fatigue is highly problematic in social situations, because outsiders (by 
which I mean those not fluent in the parlance of chronic illness) usually assume that the 
person is referring to sensations that they can easily identify with, such as feelings of 
tiredness or fatigue resulting from overwork, or sleepiness related to insufficient sleep. 
Though this 'outsider' may wish to help a suffering friend feel less isolated amongst their 
suffering, the usual result is misunderstanding on their part and frustration for the friend. 
According to several studies by the CDC, the level of fatigue due to CFS has been 
compared to that experienced by cancer patients after chemotherapy treatments, end stage 
renal failure, multiple sclerosis, and end stage AIDS patients.
18
 Sleep does nothing to 
relieve it; an all-encompassing fatigue of both mind and body, it can be utterly 
debilitating.  
 In any case, however the fatigue is described or quantified, it is not the only CFS 
symptom that individuals are forced to function with; they may have one or more of the 
following: muscle pain and weakness, abnormally low or high body temperatures, 
sensitivity to light and sound, headaches, swollen lymph nodes, post-exertional malaise 
(defined as an inappropriate amount of pain and fatigue as a result of 'normal' exertion), 
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and various cognitive and memory impairments are common (Fukuda, et. al., 1994). 
Added to these symptoms are a whole host of additional discomforts that may arise from 
the side-effects of medications and other treatments meant to lessen the original 
symptoms. For all of the above reasons, advocates within the United States have 
embraced the name 'Chronic Fatigue and Immunodeficiency Syndrome' (CFIDS) to 
reflect findings which posit immune system complications and dysfunctions within the 
etiology of the illness. Nevertheless, the name Chronic Fatigue Syndrome still persists in 
both lay and research literatures.  
 Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom and among the Commonwealth nations, the 
illness has been known as ME, or 'Myalgic Encephalomyelitus.'  The documented onset 
of ME in the United Kingdom dates from a 1955 outbreak of a mysterious illness at the 
Royal Free Hospital; though it was later attributed to a case of "mass hysteria," ME 
symptoms nevertheless continued to pop-up (Ramsay & O'Sullivan, 1956; Richardson, 
AT., 1956; McEvedy & Beard, 1970; Evengård, B., et al. 1999). As of 2011, the National 
Health Service estimated that around 250,000 people in the UK were suffering with 
ME.
19
 'Myalgia' refers to muscle pain, and 'encephalomyelitus' 
20
 to inflammation of the 
brain and spinal cord, which is what researchers initially thought the illness was related 
to. In the past decade, however, officials in the UK have recommended dropping ME in 
favor of CFS because there is little evidence that inflammation of the spine or spinal cord 
is involved (Evengård, B., et al. 1999). 
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 Fibromyalgia, or Fibromyalgia Syndrome, as it is also known, shares many 
overlapping symptoms with CFS. It also is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that tests 
are first run to rule out any other diseases which could potentially cause a patient's 
symptoms. 'Fibromyalgia' literally means 'fibrous muscle pain,' and refers to pain in the 
muscles and connective tissue. One theory about FMS is that the brain is incorrectly 
processing pain signals, drastically lowering a person's tolerance for pain (Ngian et al. 
2011). The co-morbidity of CFS and FMS is quite high; this has definitely been my own 
experience, and was also frequently mentioned in my survey results. From my personal 
perspective, I have often wondered if the two are essentially the same, except that fatigue 
is the prerogative of CFS, while pain that of FMS.
21
 Symptoms include muscle pain, 
muscle tenderness, cognitive issues such a short-term memory loss or trouble 
concentrating (known as 'fibrofog'), un-refreshing sleep, fatigue, pelvic pain, and 
depression (Crofford 2012).  
 In 1999, the American College of Rheumatology released diagnostic guidelines 
which included the use of the 'tender point' test (Wolfe et al. 1999). A physician uses 
light finger pressure to touch certain spots on the patient's body, especially near their 
joints. In a normal person without FMS, this would seem ridiculous and cause no 
discomfort. But for someone with tender points, a feather-light touch can cause 
immediate and intense, searing pain. 
22
 Recently, the American College of Rheumatology 
has released new updated guidelines that do not require tender points, but instead focus 
on the report of the patient (Crofford 2012). This reflects the fact that not every person 
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with FMS has tender points, something that used to be recognized as a hallmark. As with 
CFS, FMS is said to occur predominantly in women (Crofford 2012; Greenhalgh 2001). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the validity of Fibromyalgia as a distinct entity has been 
vigorously questioned (Wolfe 2009; Goldenberg 1995).  
 Though both CFS and FMS are gendered as female, and are diagnosed most 
predominantly in women, this final category of contested illnesses cannot say the same. 
The history of Gulf War Syndrome, or Gulf War Related Illnesses (GWRIs) is a 
particularly fascinating story. During deployment, soldiers complained of health 
problems, and these continued after they returned home from the 1991 Gulf War. Large 
numbers of them fell ill with mysterious symptoms like "sleep problems, mood swings, 
short-term memory loss, chronic fatigue, rashes, aching joints, headaches, abdominal 
pain, multiple chemical sensitivities, blurred vision, gastrointestinal problems, and sexual 
dysfunction," none of which bloodtests and medical examinations could account for 
(Shriver & Waskul 2006:466; Brown et al. 2000; Brown et al. 2003; Zavestoski et 
al.2002; Zavestoski et al. 2004). 
  In addition to the sufferers being overwhelmingly male, GWRIs are classified as 
environmental illnesses. Unlike CFS/FMS, GWRIs are not conceptualized as something 
that might lurk in the body, waiting to be triggered by some form of trauma or pathogen. 
Instead, they are attributed to outside causes, specifically environmental exposure. Prior 
to their deployment to Iraq, veterans were given large preemptive courses of vaccines;
23
 
and while deployed, they claim that they were exposed to both chemical and biological 
weaponry. Although the United States government initially denied that exposure 
occurred, they later admitted that "some soldiers were exposed to chemical agents near 
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the Khamisiyah weapons depot after coalition forces destroyed it" but denied that such 
exposure necessarily correlates with illness (Shriver & Waskul 2006:466). If word of ill 
soldiers had gotten out, the U.S. Government would have a potentially tarnished image of 
such a hugely successful enemy defeat via technologically advanced surgical strikes 
(Brown et al. 2003:236).  
 While the gender of most GWRI would-be patients is male, their experiences are 
strikingly identical to those of CFS and FMS patients. Veterans describe being sent to 
psychiatrist after psychiatrist, since PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) was a prime 
way to excuse all manner of symptoms. And if their physical symptoms weren't 
immediately written off as PTSD (a rash, for example) they were explained away by the 
flimsiest of causes; in a desperate bid to find relief, veterans incurred thousands of dollars 
in debt seeking the opinions of private, non-VA doctors (Shriver & Waskul 2006).  
 Regardless of the name that describes a chronic, contested illness, whether it's 
chosen for descriptive purposes (Fibromyalgia), in a bid to sound more biomedically 
legitimate (Chronic Fatigue Immunodeficiency Syndrome), or to associate it with outside 
causes (Gulf War Syndrome), the experiences of the suffering are essentially the same. A 
strong soldier, an active mom, an energetic kid – any of these people could be healthy 
one moment, and fall grievously ill the next. Identities have to be repaired, life goals re-
evaluated, and inner turmoil contained as they hop from frustrating doctor visit to 
frustrating doctor visit. And once they do find a sympathetic MD., there is still no cure 
for any of these chronic illnesses. Even with treatment, sometimes people will reach a 
new threshold; having transitioned from healthy to ill, they must now contend with 
moving from ill to disabled. 
20 
 
The Politics of Disability 
 
 There is no reason to believe that the invisibility of a disability itself necessarily 
 lessens its impact or makes the disability less serious. Though not as easily 
 stigmatized in  obvious or familiar ways, persons with invisible disabilities are 
 subject to forms of rejection, humiliation, and social disapproval that are 
 importantly similar. 
24
 
 
For a chronically ill person, the decision to incorporate the identity label 'disabled' 
is one that comes at great personal expense. It is not one imposed from without, as it is 
done with a certain violence to people with disabilities that they cannot hide. Instead, it 
can be a strategy of last resort, necessitated by a lack of health insurance or by job loss. 
Or it can slowly dawn on one, as life activity after life activity are slowly subsumed by 
the imperative to attend to various disruptive bodily symptoms and changing sensations. 
However the decision is reached, it is not done lightly, and usually because it is the lesser 
of two evils. Yet the non outwardly-obvious character of this type of disability means that 
social and institutional mechanisms of support and accommodation are sometimes out of 
reach, if only because it takes an incredible amount of energy and focus to pursue them. 
This is partly the case because, as Susan Wendell (2001) describes, "it is safer and 
more comfortable for disability activism to focus on people who are healthy disabled" 
(19). Healthy disabled are people with disabilities who are "permanently and predictably 
impaired" (21). Their status does not change due to an illness, but instead they are forced 
to reckon with an impairment, a lack. But this is a framework imposed by dominant 
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disability politics, and does not accurately reflect the full reality of disabled experiences. 
In contrast, an "ill" person is sickly, gimpy. They are not likely to join in competitive 
sports any time soon, and their condition may in fact worsen over time. There are in fact 
people with visible disabilities who are also chronically ill. And it is a reality often 
hidden under the political rug that certain impairments can indeed also cause illness down 
the road (Wade 1994). But the image of the inspirational disabled person achieving 
extraordinary feats despite 'adversity' is also, as Wendell points out, more comfortable for 
the nondisabled; people who can adhere to this image "can make others forget they are 
disabled" and therefore "will be allowed to participate most fully in the activities of their 
society" (22). Thus we can see that disabilities are not created equal.  
The definition of disability itself is a moving target. I personally prefer the 
amended Americans with Disabilities Act (2008 [1990]), but Wendell (1996, 2001) 
provides an extremely useful analysis that incorporates the socio-cultural aspects as well 
as the biological or biomedical aspects of disability. To do this, she combines the United 
Nations 1983 definition of disability augmented by the observations of philosopher Ron 
Amundson. To summarize, there are two interrelated notions of disability; one is the 
biologically grounded impairment of a person's body, but this in itself does not constitute 
disability. Importantly, it is the impairment against the context of specific cultural and 
geospatial expectations of performance that renders an impairment a disability.  
Within this framing, not meeting societal expectations such as literacy can come 
to be coded as a disability (cf. McDermott & Varenne 1995). This argument can be taken 
too far, if attention is lost on the physical suffering and becomes too focused on unfair 
societal expectations and 'able-isms.'  This risks morphing into the anti-biomedicalization 
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or illness reification paradigms that are unfortunately all-too prevalent in critical feminist 
and other discourses on disability.  This subject will be more fully attended to in the next 
chapter, however for now it will perhaps be more productive to turn away from the 
abstract and return again to realm of the everyday for persons visibly and 'invisibly' 
disabled. 
An article from 1973 in the Journal of Health and Social Behavior provides a 
valuable outline of the differing social experiences among those with visible impairments 
versus those with invisible impairments. 
25
 Sociologists interviewed more than two 
thousand people who were receiving disability benefits in one of three metro locations: 
New Orleans, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Columbus, Ohio.  The data accounted for 
income levels, age, and gender. Far beyond anything that I could undertake alone, this 
study employed a diverse clinical team of experts including ―social workers, doctors, 
psychologists, occupational therapists, and vocational counselors‖ to conduct ―structured 
interviews…narrative reports, and laboratory tests" (118). The sociologists begin the 
article by outlining their initial hypotheses, and then go on to describe the ways in which 
the data either supported or refuted them; thus I believe this article is uniquely structured 
so that it is not only valuable to my argument because of the rich quantitative data it 
provides, but also because it lends itself to analysis as a cultural document in and of itself. 
By contrasting the researchers' initial expected results with their revised findings, we can 
get a fascinating glimpse into some of America‘s ‗common sense‘ assumptions (even as 
they are also academic, educated assumptions) which center around the social lives of the 
disabled.  
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The article begins by explaining the rationale behind conducting such a study in 
the first place – that while scholars had demonstrated the deleterious effects that visible 
impairments have upon social interaction, there had not been much specificity about the 
kinds of social interactions in which this was said to be taking place, nor had there been 
an accounting of just how impactful the impairments were vis-à-vis different social 
contexts:  familial, conjugal, casual, etc. Specifically, the sociologists chose to focus on 
―interpersonal relations…includ[ing] relations with spouse, general family relations, 
relations with friends, and casual secondary encounters" (116). The facets of 
‗impairment‘ accounted for in the study were, ―severity of the impairment; the kind of 
functional limitations associated with the impairment; and visibility of the impairment.‖  
Among the seven hypotheses put forward at the beginning of the study, the following are 
most pertinent to my analysis:  
Hypothesis 1) As severity of physical limitation increases, the amount of 
disruption in interpersonal relations of the impaired increases.  
Hypothesis 4) The greater the loss in employment skills the greater will be the 
disability in all types of interpersonal relations.  
Hypothesis 6) Visibility will be more disruptive of secondary interpersonal 
relations than of primary relations.  
Hypothesis 7) Visible disorders will be more disruptive of interpersonal relations 
among young people than older people and among those in lower socioeconomic 
class.  
 
 No initial justifications are provided for Hypothesis 1, but Hypothesis 4 was 
predicted to hold ―more true  for males than for females‖ since (at least as of 1973) male 
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status within both the familial and outside social contexts hinged heavily on a man‘s 
ability to be fully and successfully employable. Hypothesis 6 relating to the overall 
visibility of impairments is also taken to be self-evident, but the explanation for 
Hypothesis 7 reveals a wealth of commonsensical assumptions about the relationship 
between society‘s expectations of youth and the consequences of an impaired young 
person‘s failure to present a ―body beautiful…body whole‖ (117). The logic operating 
here suggests that young people would reject one of their own for being a failure more 
readily than a member of an older generation would theirs, simply because slowing down 
in one‘s advanced years is taken to be a natural given.26 Such a visual affront to the 
fantasy of the beautiful, vibrant youth would therefore present a constant challenge to 
smooth interpersonal interaction between a young person and their peers.  
 In addition to age groups and gender, the hypotheses suggested overall that 
attitudes toward visible impairments would also vary between income levels. While 
lower classes were expected to be more familiar with hard labor, and therefore injury, the 
upper and middle, educated classes were expected to experience increased frustration 
when confronted with an inability to control their own health situation. In this case, the 
―passive acceptance of natural phenomena‖ that lower classes were forced into acquiring 
through their lessened circumstances would prove here to be a blessing instead of a curse 
(118). The over-arching expectation at the outset of the study was that as visibility of 
impairment increases, so too would the difficulty of smooth interpersonal interactions 
across all social contexts.  
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But except where the impairment involved a grave reduction in the mechanical 
faculties of communication, the results of the study revealed that the obverse of the initial 
hypotheses was true. Where the ambiguity of health status increased, so too did the 
breakdown in interpersonal relationships among all social contexts, and across ages, 
genders, and income levels. Where impairment was judged as a measure of the degree to 
which employment was affected by physical limitations, the study did prove that 
impairment had a decided effect on interpersonal relations – however it was the ―opposite 
of that predicted by the hypothesis. Overall, data indicated that the more severely 
impaired are likely to have better interpersonal relations than are the less severely 
impaired.‖ 27 
Of course, ―better‖ is in the eye of the beholder, and many visibly disabled people 
have objected to being routinely forced into the role of ‗the disabled‘ for the comfort and 
convenience of the non-disabled. For the sociologists conducting the study, the ―better‖ is 
derived from the fact that ―norms attendant the sick and/or disabled role become clearly 
applicable‖ for interlocutors in social situations, in stark contrast to the disrupted, fraught 
social encounters that the less visibly impaired are constantly subjected to.  In musing the 
reasons for why this might be so, the study offers two possible scenarios: that the less 
visibly disabled are more ―psychologically disturbed,‖ and therefore difficult, or that the 
absence of visual cues results in a failure to evoke ―sympathetic and humanitarian 
responses from others" (119). 
The results stated in their conclusion indicate that the latter possibility is the more 
probable one. For Hypothesis 1, as long as the impaired person retained some basic, 
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functional abilities for communication, their unambiguous disabled status resulted in 
overall positive interpersonal relationships as measured against ―loss of communication 
skills, loss of employment skills, and impairment of sexual functioning.‖ The conclusion 
of Hypothesis 4, relating employment status and social interaction, found that for 
friendships and casual acquaintances employability was still a strong contributing factor, 
especially for men. However, for the conjugal or family relationships, a person unable to 
work actually had better family and spousal relationships than did those who were 
unemployed yet could be employed in a work situation, presumably with 
accommodations. Once again the researchers use the language of roles and clarity – 
―Apparently, clear-cut functional limitations call forth sympathetic responses from family 
members, leading perhaps to a family organization in which one member is cast into the 
disabled role‖  (120).  
By this point in the study, the answers to Hypothesis 6 & 7 are already becoming 
clear. The role of the visibly, ‗totally disabled‘ person is the safest one to inhabit when in 
social situations, whether it be with spouse, family, friends, or coworkers. Even spouses 
with impaired sexual function seemed to enjoy a better family life than those who were 
physically impaired, but yet still retained some sexual abilities. The non-visibility of 
impairments, with visibility here broadly defined as the presence of ―equipment for 
ambulation or muscular support,‖ was the strongest predictor of social strife for the 
disabled. Contrary to expectations, this was still true even of the younger age groups: ―the 
visibly impaired tended to get along better in interpersonal relations than did the non-
visibly impaired‖ (122).  
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 In sum, this research supports the assertion that in the absence of a mitigating 
circumstance of being ‗obviously‘ disabled, a person is qualified in the social realm to be 
morally judged according to how well they conform to a dizzying array of cultural and 
aesthetic expectations attendant to all would-be productive citizens of the Western world: 
the physically active, economically strong, masculine provider (Charmaz 1994; Shriver & 
Waskul 2006; Gilmore 1990; Gutmann 1997); the do-everything feminist Super-Mom 
who also somehow makes time for herself, despite her demanding career (Wendell 
1996:4); the hard-partying, yet stubbornly exuberant and virile young person who works 
their way full-time through their equally full-time studies; just to name a few familiar 
archetypes. Everyone is fit. Everyone manages their time well (Martin 1994; 2009).  
 Violating these expectations arouses suspicion and disbelief, especially when 
there is a claim of disability that does not seem visibly justified. Such claims risk being 
undermined not only in everyday social situations, but also by the discourse generated 
within realms of medical or critical scholarly expertise. These alternatives to embodied 
authority pose a unique level of challenge inasmuch as an individual is forced to engage 
with it, or if potential access to legitimating discourses are threatened to be blocked in 
some way by it. In other words, it is unavoidable. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Contesting Illness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The insistence that one group of people should be entrusted with 
the characterization of another group of people, and the allegation 
of the obvious superiority of the "experts"' criteria of group 
membership to those formulated by members of the group in 
question on the basis of their lived experiences are the epitome of 
oppression, and perhaps even an ostensive definition of it. 
28
  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 Claims that threaten or destroy the legitimacy of another's suffering can certainly 
spring from everyday banal social interactions, the dynamics of which will be explored in 
greater detail in the final chapter of this paper. But when unequal power relations are 
added to the mix, the potency of oppression takes on a new dimension. This chapter is 
about the ways that two species of experts, medical doctors and critical scholars, have 
woven alternative narratives which, in some cases by design and some cases not, 
challenge the authority of those who make embodied claims about their own suffering; 
these embodied claims are called "illness narratives" which allow others to "study the 
patient‘s illness experience and illness world as a social reality apart from the conception 
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and definition of illness as formulated by biomedicine" (Kleinman 1988; Hydén 
1997:49). 
29
  
 In his article, ―Illness and narrative,‖ Hydén provides a useful overview of this 
use of the narrative concept within medical contexts and its changing meaning within the 
social science fields. Narrative, for medical sociology, proliferated in the 1980s and 
1990s. The concept is most generally defined as a way of conveying life histories and 
especially the experience of a change over time – such as the development of an illness –
at the most basic level it is defined as having a beginning, middle, and end. At first, 
physicians were encouraged to pay attention to patient narratives to listen for clues which 
would enable them to parse together a diagnostic hypothesis; narratives were also a way 
that doctors could supposedly ‗read‘ a patient as if they were a text. To take it even a step 
further, narratives were also used to look into how doctors were constructing the patient 
as social reality. Finally, the concept of the 'narrative' progressed to signifying the ways 
in which people make sense of their life socially. 
 The ways that narrative has been deployed in biomedical encounters and in 
critical scholarship can be illustrated by comparing and contrasting two texts, each 
written by experts in their respective fields. Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of 
Illness was written by a medical doctor with training in literary theory, and Under the 
Medical Gaze: Facts and Fiction about Chronic Pain, was written by an anthropologist, 
also savvy in literary theory, who made her personal illness narrative into the auto-
ethnography centering her analysis. By scrutinizing their methodologies, assumptions, 
and political proclivities, we might piece together how these alternative narratives are 
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constructed, and in turn, the different ways that they challenge the authoritative voice of 
the sufferer. 
 
  
A Physician's Narrative 
 
 
As discussed earlier, chronic illnesses do not meet our expectations in several 
different ways: those disabled by them do not outwardly appear as we are accustomed to 
seeing the stigmatized ‗handicapped;‘ rather than a consistent state of blindness, 
paralysis, or the like, many chronic illnesses are by nature ever-changing and cycle from 
a worsened state into a remission state; they are not a transient sickness to be cured yet 
also not a fatal illness to attend. Neither the possible causes of contested chronic illnesses 
nor their diagnostic criteria enjoy epidemiological consensus, and thus medical opinion 
on the veracity of these illnesses can vary from doctor to doctor. They guarantee eternally 
frustrated medical providers, who far from being able to sweep in and restore health, are 
continually confronted with Normal or Inconclusive lab results and a stubbornly plaintive 
patient. Kleinman (1988) sums it up nicely: 
The upshot is that practitioners, trained to think of ‗real‘ disease entities, with 
natural histories and precise outcomes, find chronic illness messy and threatening. 
They have been taught to regard with suspicion patients‘ illness narratives and 
causal beliefs. The form of those narratives and explanations may indicate a 
morbid process; the content may lead them astray (4).  
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 When their diagnostic strategies do not bring forth results that correlate with the 
reported suffering of the patient, many physicians decide that the problem must be a 
psychological one, since depression can cause or worsen common complaints like pain or 
poor sleep. The patient has reported ‗serious complaints,‘ but the doctor now knows that 
the complaint is not ‗serious.‘ Therefore, the patient diagnosed with a chronic illness 
suffers doubly in that they are told that they likely have an incurable, barely treatable 
condition, but should not be overly devastated because it ‗might‘ go away, and after all, 
they won‘t die from it. 
Even if one were to finally locate a doctor willing to take their symptoms 
seriously, there is always the future risk that any change in care providers might result in 
a skeptical doctor who may disagree with the diagnosis, refuse to consider it biomedically 
valid, and potentially withhold any treatment that the patient may have been receiving 
from the diagnosing physician.  The potential for misdiagnosis is also very high, as later 
developments may reveal another primary cause that the doctor may have missed. In 
addition to overlapping symptoms between chronic illnesses, some criteria include the 
diagnosis of another chronic illness! 
30
 Because the strategy for treatment of most chronic 
illnesses focuses on the reduction of symptoms, it often may not make considerable 
difference which label physicians choose, so long as they work with the patient on 
strategies to keep the suffering at manageable levels.  
  But the ability to attend to patients' suffering is predicated upon the notion that a 
doctor will keep an open mind and listen to what they have to say. This is what Rita 
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Charon, MD., proposes that doctors do. An internist also trained in literary theory, 
Charon espouses what she calls ―narrative medicine.‖ The term refers to ―a clinical 
practice informed by the theory and practice of reading, writing, telling, and receiving of 
stories‖(viii).  She believes that training medical students in literary theory and 
methodologies can help to instill in them traits like humility, accountability, and 
empathy.  In her book, Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness, she lays out a 
vision for narratively-informed doctors, frequently calling upon them to ―bear witness to 
the patients‘ suffering.‖  
 By ―bearing witness‖ she means allowing the patient to have a sufficient amount 
of the doctor‘s time whereby they can sit and listen to the stories the patients tell of their 
experiences of illness. She lists bearing witness as one of three essential literary skills, 
along with close reading, and reflective writing. In her accounting, close reading sounds 
very much like active listening; by being versed in the various ways of reading texts, and 
applying them to the narratives shared by patients, doctors can 'see' inside a patient‘s 
understanding of their own suffering. Reflective writing refers to methods of recording 
information within the clinical context, and can also refer to the diaries that medical 
students are encouraged to keep to enable them to reflect upon their experiences with 
patients. 
 In explaining how she came to practice narrative medicine, Charon relates an 
early lesson that she learned when doing her first bit of reflective writing. She describes 
an encounter with a possible case of chronic illness, and it provides a fascinating glimpse 
into her viewpoint as an attending physician. She describes her patient, ―Luz,‖ as an 
attractive young woman of twenty-one. Luz had come to her several times complaining 
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of headaches which Charon ―had not considered terribly worrisome;‖ she was prescribed 
acetaminophen. Finally one day, Luz appeared at the doctor‘s office without an 
appointment, asking Charon to sign a disability form for her. ―I remembered being 
irritated,‖ she writes, ―not only that she thought she deserved disability on such slim 
clinical grounds but that she would appear, without an appointment, and expect me to 
make time to fill out the form" (5).  Hurried, busy, and late for a meeting, the doctor 
complied.  
 The incident later bothered her because she had acted ―brusquely and dismissively 
without knowing [Luz‘s] situation.‖ Not knowing the real reasons behind Luz‘s sudden 
appearance, Charon then decided to write reflectively about the experience, filling in the 
missing details with her own work of fiction. In this literary exercise, she wrote from the 
perspective of Luz, who (in her story) was an aspiring model hoping to move to 
Manhattan in the pursuit of a career. The disability payments would support her as she 
looked for a job. In reality, Luz did need to move to Manhattan, but her situation was far 
from glamorous. She wanted desperately to move her sisters out of their sexually abusive 
home and set up a new, safe place for them.  Though her imagination hadn‘t been very 
close to the mark, Charon explains that this narrative exercise had succeeded in 
motivating her to learn of "[Luz‘s] true plight instead of blaming her or suspecting her of 
malingering"(6). The effort of the storytelling exercise had helped her "take care of the 
patient by bringing me to her side, seeking to understand her behavior, taking seriously 
her situation, and gaining access to the unsaid knowledge I had already developed of her 
strengths and desires." 
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Perhaps the most noteworthy part of this anecdote is that Charon never again 
referred to the headaches or even the possibility that Luz might have been suffering on a 
debilitating level. In her mind, she had failed Luz as a doctor not because she had 
dismissed her patient's symptoms, but because she hadn‘t cared enough for the patient to 
invest the effort required to find out what was 'really' going on. The headaches must have 
been dismissed either as an exaggeration on Luz's part, or as simply a byproduct of Luz‘s 
abusive past, but Charon never elaborates. Nowhere does she wonder why Luz would 
attempt to support herself and four sisters on a paltry disability payment. Nor does she 
mull over the fact that an attractive twenty-one year old, apparently beautiful enough to 
be a model, was asking to be labeled as disabled. Surely a job would have provided more 
income than government payments? The question of her would-be ‗disabled‘ status is 
never again addressed, her attempted ‗fraud‘ glossed over. Clearly, 'narrative medicine' is 
not what it initially appeared to be. 
Despite her claims that narratives are an intersubjective experience, beneficial to 
all involved, an examination of Charon‘s terminology reveals that a somewhat insidious 
and persistent partition exists between doctor and patient. Dichotomies of sick/well, 
doctors/patients, clinicians/patients, sick person/professional proliferate her prose; she 
even refers to ―we, the healthy‖ when addressing her paragraphs primarily to fellow 
doctors (97).  Importantly, she sees narrative medicine as a form of therapy for doctors 
who are constantly confronted with the suffering of others, because, she explains, ―many 
health professionals are uncomfortable around emotion‖ (98). This begs the question: Just 
who is the practice of 'narrative medicine' primarily supposed to help? She insists that 
doctors must use narrative medicine as best they can to approach the realm of the patient, 
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because even their conception of time is different: ―health professionals have an urgent 
need to examine and make at least imaginative sense of how patients might experience 
time‖ (121). They must ―imagine the times of others‖ and ―envision the inner experience 
of its passage‖ (122). What is more, she cautions, patients do not have a full 
understanding of their own mortality.  
Using Charon's framework, then, doctors and patients are profoundly at odds. It 
sounds so promising, initially: ―[a]ny effort to provide health care begins by bestowing 
attention on the patient‖ (132). But quickly devolves into something else: ―We clinicians 
donate ourselves as meaning-making vessels to the patient who tells of his or her 
situation; we act almost as ventriloquists to give voice to that which the patient emits.‖ 
Herself a third-generation M.D., she dutifully reminds doctors that ―our bestowing of the 
gift of attention, or presence, incurs in us both responsibilities toward the other and 
transformations within the self‖ (134). Aren't we lucky? 
In this formulation of narrative the dictum of ‗honor the stories of illness‘ appears 
at first to be a more or less straightforward call for doctors to spend more time with 
patients, and to avoid discounting patient voices as they attempt to share their own illness 
narratives with their doctor. This would theoretically have therapeutic effects for the 
patient, and also has the added incentive of providing possible clues to the diagnosis. 
Alas, this does not seem to be the case. Charon warns that: ―It is folly to expect that a 
sick person can tell a professional what the matter is. If some oral narratives of illness 
sound chronological, well organized, and coherent, it is probably because the patient 
wrote an outline and rehearsed its performance‖ (99). What happened to honoring the 
stories of illness? 
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Indeed, as the book proceeds, an altogether eerier version of the subtitle suggests 
itself: the ‗honoring‘ in ‗honoring the stories of illness‘ really means bestowing the gift of 
a physician‘s attention. To risk putting it cynically, physicians will proceed to 
magnanimously deploy their superior narrative and diagnostic skills to pluck hapless 
patients from the depths of their naiveté and deposit them into the light of truth. ―The 
listener, or reader, is not a passive receptacle. Instead he or she is shaping, questing, 
asking, probing, forming hypotheses, trying hypotheses, delving into possible 
interpretations, looking for clues everywhere, listening for the authentic voice‖ (58). Not 
only is it a responsibility to engage in this ―probing,‖ ―meaning-making,‖ and 
―imagining,‖ it is also a duty and privilege for the professional clinician: ―Knowing 
something about the body grants us the license to near another. It grants us admission to a 
proximity to the self of the other, and, by reflection, of ourselves‖ (xii).  
I found the effect of reading this text altogether claustrophobic. I am not sure 
which is worse, the detached, dismissive doctor, or one engaged in Charon's brand of 
narrative medicine. The impulse to annex what is generally seen as the purview of a 
psychiatrist or psychologist and then graft it onto clinical practice is first of all alarming 
to me as a patient, and second of all it strikes me as move to grasp onto even more power 
and authority. This idea was put forward to be an improvement upon doctor-patient 
relations, but I suspect that it merely opens up yet another space for doctors to engage in 
"delegitimation" (Ware 1992; Kleinman 1992). Many, many studies and research articles 
have interviewed patients with chronic illnesses and have catalogued their war stories of 
delegitimation by physicians (Prins et al. 2000; Dawes 1991; Clarke & James 2003; 
37 
 
Åsbring & Narvanen 2003; Cooper 1997; Deale & Wessely 2001; Shriver & Waskul 
2006). But here is a recent example from my own bit of research:  
I know I have M.E - I've been sick since I was 8yrs old and I'm now 20. The docs 
 tried to say I had PTSD (Post-traumatic Stress Disorder) [and] they even accused 
 my mum of abusing me....the medical profs have no idea what they're doing!!!! 
 
In the absence of  biomedical 'proof,' frustrated doctors move to shuttle patients off to the 
psychiatrist, thinking that their  complaints must be psychosocial in origin (Chaudhuri & 
Behan 2004; Evengård & Komaroff 1999). This dynamic is perhaps unsurprising, but 
what is surprising is a disturbing convergence: the move to attribute psychosocial causes 
to embodied suffering also pervades critical feminist discourses - the very projects meant 
to critique the unequal power relations between doctor and patient. The next section 
examines just such a project. 
 
 
 
 
The Critical Scholarship Narrative 
 
 In the mid-1990s, anthropologist Susan Greenhalgh began to experience increased 
pain. Already diagnosed with psoriatic arthritis, she became alarmed by the new tenacity 
and intensity of her chronic pain. Hearing of a specialist a few states away, she travelled 
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to seek out the opinion of a rheumatologist. This first encounter with her new physician 
inaugurated almost 8 months of stress, wildly fluctuating symptoms, and reactions to 
heavy medications –all of which ultimately converged into what she describes as a near-
nervous breakdown. This rheumatologist, significantly a male rheumatologist, was 
convinced that Greenhalgh had a rare (as it was thought then) and little-known chronic 
illness called Fibromyalgia. This illness had no cure, nor treatments for an underlying 
cause, and the prognosis was not an encouraging one, to say the least. And she would 
likely have it for the rest of her life. Her ability to concentrate and perform her roles as 
scholar and professor would likely decline, and her only hope was to trust in her doctor 
completely. Faced with this devastating development, Greenhalgh dealt with it the best 
way she knew how: as a scholar. She took meticulous notes, keeping records of her 
interactions with the doctor during her appointments and of their written and phone 
correspondence. She also maintained a detailed a diary of her daily struggles with this 
mysterious new illness. These materials formed the base of her autoethnography.     
Despite some internal misgivings, over the next several months she flew out 
multiple times to consult with her new doctor, following his advice and 
recommendations. In order to treat her ‗Fibromyalgia‘ he prescribed a cocktail of very 
strong drugs, which included an anti-inflammatory the side effects of which were known 
to cause headaches and mental fog. When she began to experience persistent headaches 
and maddening cognitive effects, the doctor instead attributed them to her ‗Fibromyalgia‘ 
and recommended that she also take over the counter headache medicine. In addition, 
when she was given sleeping medications, which had the potential for addiction, she 
became increasingly disturbed as she grew to feel that she could no longer sleep without 
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them. Her doctor, however, was unperturbed. Apart from this new medication regime, he 
counseled her to cut out any activities that might threaten to exacerbate her symptoms, 
and this resulted in so many serious restrictions on her life that she felt as if her very 
identity was slipping away.  
In misery and desperation, through the haze of side effects and stress, she was 
able to reach out to another rheumatologist for a second opinion. Fortunately for 
Greenhalgh this rheumatologist was a woman. She did not concur with the diagnosis of 
Fibromyalgia, and moreover, she considered such an extreme drug therapy far out of the 
mainstream of medical practices. In her opinion, instead of ‘Fibromyalgia,‘ what 
Greenhalgh suffered from was her psoriatic arthritis – and the effects of ―psychosocial 
pressure‖ to be a compliant woman in the face of a patriarchal, heterosexual male doctor. 
Empowered and finally relieved of the potent drug side effects, she returned to her 
original doctor and confronted him with her new realization. In an especially interesting 
and dramatic part of the book, she relates what happened as she delivered a written 
statement, in person, to her doctor, which laid out the conclusions she had come to 
regarding his faulty diagnosis of Fibromyalgia. In her opinion, his all-encompassing 
belief in the correctness of his diagnosis had caused him to bolster his own opinion when 
his ‗treatment‘ inadvertently replicated symptoms commonly attributed to Fibromyalgia. 
Perhaps predictably, she was met by an indignant and baffled response.  
Driven by her negative experiences, Greenhalgh determined to write an auto-
ethnography about it in the hopes that others would be helped by an account of her 
ordeal. She presents her story as a clear-cut case of an overbearing male doctor against a 
strong female scholar who eventually found her voice and told him ‗No.‘ However, she 
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reaches beyond her own illness narrative to make a bold claim: ‗Fibromyalgia‘ does not 
exist. It never has existed. Though the suffering that women experience is ‗real,‘ 
Greenhalgh says, it springs from societal pressures and felt inequalities; these expressions 
of suffering are then medicalized and labeled ‗Fibromyalgia.‘ ―From witches to hysterics 
to fibromylagics, women have been harmed or incited to harm themselves for deviating 
from expected gender norms" (7). Therefore, in this construction, once a woman realizes 
as Greenhalgh did that her Fibromyalgia diagnosis is false, the mental oppression will be 
relieved and the physical suffering will fall away. But interestingly, she takes care to 
draw a line between chronic illness and ―established chronic diseases [such] as arthritis, 
diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease.‖ 31 Speaking directly to those ―afflicted with 
the new chronic conditions of late-twentieth century civilization,‖ she explains that, 
―Women desperate for someone to acknowledge and alleviate their suffering go to their 
doctors to name and ease their new pains. Professionally obligated to heal and motivated 
by humanitarian impulses, our doctors try to live up to our expectations‖ (3).  
 This anti-illness reification, or anti-biomedical discourse, has unfortunately been a 
common one within critical feminist scholarship.  Contested illnesses by their precarity 
lend themselves readily to all manner of etiological schemes. As Goffman (1964) says, 
―the point where medical science must withdraw is the point where society can act most 
determinatively‖ (124).  Particularly, the notion of the "mindful body" (Scheper-Hughes 
and Lock 1987) has provided an analytic space to attribute political and social causality 
to bodily suffering in ways that pose a strong challenge to illness narratives: "Sickness is 
not just...an unfortunate brush with nature. It is a form of communication - the language 
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of the organs - through which nature, society, and culture speak simultaneously" 
(DiGiacomo 1992:25). I rather agree with Susan DiGiacomo when she objects to this sort 
of project for enlightening the ill masses "that proposes, rather patronizingly, to instruct 
them (us) in the 'true' nature and sources of their affliction" (1992: 128).  
 But I don't wish to give the impression that I am discounting or condemning all of 
the valuable work done by feminist scholars; in fact, the very ethnographies that this 
analysis relies on as both a source of illness narrative and autoethnography were written 
by critically-informed feminist scholars. They recount how their political and theoretical 
commitments interacted with their experiences of illness in interesting ways. Susan 
DiGiacomo, an anthropologist and cancer survivor, relates how her experiences with 
Hodgkin's disease caused her to see some feminist scholarship in a different light. For 
example, in analyzing Susan Sontag's "Illness as Metaphor" (1978), she concludes that:             
 It is not at all clear that the notion of illness as a 'coded metaphor' for social and 
 economic dislocation would either further the theoretical aim of developing a 
 critical medical anthropology capable of synthesizing cultural interpretation and 
 political economy, or empower the ill. 
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Susan Wendell, a CFS sufferer and also an anthropologist, offers a possible explanation 
as to why feminist scholarship has had difficulties conceptualizing the "negative body" 
(1996:166).  
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 Because the Western tradition particularly devalued women's bodies and 
 appropriated the authority to describe bodily experiences unique to women... in 
 reaction to this tradition and its consequences, feminists have celebrated the body, 
 emphasizing aspects of bodily experiences that are sources of pleasure, 
 satisfaction, and feelings of connection. 
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Even though these reactions were valuable, she explains, this tendency to focus on the 
good body has diverted focus away from the bodies that are "a source of frustration, 
suffering and even torment" (167). This has the tendency to alienate disabled women, 
who cannot participate in this picture of the ideal female "any more than they can in the 
idealized images of sexist society." It is this effect of alienation that concerns me about 
Susan Greenhalgh's authoethnography. 
 As an expert and a patient, Greenhalgh's version of events enjoy unprecedented 
authority throughout her account. A quick internet search for books on ‗Fibromyalgia‘ 
will display her book in the results. This, together with the title, Under the Medical Gaze: 
Facts and Fiction of Chronic Pain, may lead people newly diagnosed with Fibromyalgia 
or other chronic, contested illnesses to believe her book is about something that it is not. 
It is not a source of unbiased information, nor is it a self-help book in a traditional sense. 
Crucially, the book completely also ignores the plight of men, who also suffer from and 
are diagnosed with chronic illnesses such as Gulf War Syndrome. In describing FMS in 
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such exclusively female terms, what space does that leave for a man trying to make sense 
of his own suffering?  
To use ―chronic pain‖ as shorthand for all the suffering associated with chronic 
illnesses does all chronic illness sufferers an injustice. And as one interlocutor told me, a 
diagnosis of chronic pain is fairly useless: "[it] means nothing to me apart from 
describing how I feel!" But even there it also fails. Pain is only a shade in the spectrum of 
discomforting sensations which can include various total or partial bodily weaknesses, 
stiffness, inability to concentrate or remember things, inability to maintain a comfortable 
body temperature, non-restorative sleep, post-exertional malaise, and others. And in the 
long-term, chronic pain alone can easily result in a sedentary lifestyle which eventually 
contributes to weight gain, deleterious effects on muscle strength, and reduction in 
overall stamina.  It is not surprising that this embodied experience of struggling to 
proceed with the everyday life activities adds emotional stresses including but certainly 
not limited to frustration, anger, denial, hopelessness, guilt, and shame. 
Though Greenhalgh describes the process of going through the emotional turmoil 
of adjusting to constraints on her life activities, according to her own illness narrative, 
these ‗constraints‘ were imposed a priori and not as a result of experiencing debilitating 
suffering. Greenhalgh also spends too little time attending to her own advantaged 
position and how it may have affected both her experiences of illness and the 'lessons' 
which she derived from them. Her not inconsiderable amount of social and cultural 
capital afforded her a level of physician access above and beyond the average patient 
experience. She describes ―an unusually high-contact medical relationship‖ that included 
office visits each ―ranging from two to five hours in length‖ as well as ―twenty-two 
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phone conversations running perhaps from fifteen to forty-five minutes.‖ By way of 
contrast, according to the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, Americans have, 
on average, about 13 minutes with their doctor.  
In addition, the experience of being immediately diagnosed and treated by an 
enthusiastic specialist is a novel one. In the mid 1990s, a majority of doctors remained 
skeptical of Fibromyalgia as a valid diagnosis, even after the American College of 
Rheumatology released its clinical criteria in 1990. Though research has proceeded apace 
and awareness has improved markedly within the past two decades, a glance at any 
online community of chronically ill people, especially those with Fibromyalgia, will still 
reveal a multitude of ‗war stories‘ – tales of seemingly endless appointments, ‗normal‘ 
test results, condescending (and yes, often patriarchal) doctors, and referrals to a 
psychiatrist (Barker 2008). Some have gone for years without any relief from symptoms 
because doctors have refused to accept the legitimacy of their suffering. 
Purportedly speaking for the ―plight of the ill,‖ Greenhalgh insists that one of her 
goals was to ―alert patients who are unfamiliar with social studies of biomedicine to the 
power dynamics in their medical encounters‖ (7). I suggest that this reflects a 
fundamental misconception about the common American‘s experience of chronic illness 
and diagnosis. In any case, one need not be familiar with social studies of biomedicine to 
be aware of the strident power dynamics often inherent in the doctor-patient encounter.  
Greenhalgh‘s overall logic, therefore, seems to be inexplicably backwards: ―A 
sense that one‘s body falls within the range of what is ‗normal‘ is worth fighting for, for 
once that identity is ‗spoiled‘ by a biomedical label, one is subject to all the problems of 
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the stigmatized – from discrediting and discrimination by others to feelings of shame and 
inferiority that come from within" (35). By virtue of the contested nature of chronic 
illnesses, the most common experience is the direct opposite. A biomedical label is an 
affirmation of the lived experience of not-being-normal, despite constant outside 
insistence of normalcy. As Kleinman has observed, ―The way of the specialist 
diagnostician, which is not to credit the patient‘s subjective account until it can be 
quantified and therefore rendered more ‗objective,‘ can make a shambles of the care of 
the chronically ill.‖ 34 
In sum, through privileging her own illness narrative in the formation of broader 
generalizations about chronic illness, Greenhalgh‘s argument runs the risk of alienating 
people who really are suffering with an FMS that informs their experience of their bodies 
in a way that her personal experience did not.  She often uses the word ‗narrative‘ in 
various ways depending upon the theory or body of literature she is referring to, but does 
not sufficiently attend to the particularities of her own narrative; her experience is only 
one possible narrative among many. Though she takes great pains to insist that doctors, 
despite their claims to objectivity, are also engaged in their own storytelling, she 
nevertheless seems to buy into their case at least part of the time.  
And though she accuses doctors of behaving as if biomedical truths are the only 
truths, she must also on some level agree; she seems to make the underlying assumption 
that because medical science has yet to unravel the etiological mysteries of contested 
chronic illnesses, they simply must not biomedically exist in the first place. Therefore, if 
medical science demurs from bestowing upon chronic illness a full legitimacy, the truth 
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of the matter must lie in psychosocial or sociopolitical constructs. Without invalidating 
the central accomplishments of her exploration of gender and power within the medical 
context, I believe that Greenhalgh‘s book makes potentially damaging over-
generalizations about the nature of chronic illnesses. Such generalizations, along with the 
delegitmation of suffering by medical doctors, each present sufferers with yet another 
source of stigma to manage, another battleground on which to fight for the authority to 
define their own identities. The effect of these struggles on the everyday lives of sufferers 
is the theme of the third and final chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Another Closet 
 
 
 
    
 
 This thesis has so far been concerned with laying the groundwork necessary to 
elucidate a conceptual framework that is the main thrust of my argument: that people 
with non-apparent disabilities are forced to live with crises of identity, constant threats of 
delegitimation, and with bodies that behave outside of social norms but that do not at first 
betray themselves as such. Furthermore, this mode of constant body and identity 
management that they are forced to function in is distinct both from understandings of the 
'healthy' mode of functioning, and also of the dominant paradigms used to describe the 
'disabled' mode of functioning. Therefore they can be said to inhabit a third space of 
being. Perhaps it could be called 'Gimp' space, but I am not expressly engaged in a 
project of politicization. Instead, the term is intended to conjure forth impressions of 
another conceptual third space of being - the Queer space. 
 Queer theory allows discussions to escape from a "binarized identity" (Sedgwick 
1990:2) imposed from without - significantly, between that of heterosexual and it's 
obverse, homosexual. And as Faubion (2010) notes, ―the closet is not a preserve unique 
to the homosexual. It is the safehouse of anyone suffering the accusation of deviance or 
the burden of the danger of status debasement‖ (15).Though Sedgwick herself never used 
the term "queer closet" in her foundational work Epistemology of the Closet, it came to be 
an oft-used term in queer studies. 
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 Following this tendency, I use the phrase 'the queer 
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closet' or the 'logic of the queer closet' as a framework to assist in illuminating the ways 
that people with non-apparent disabilities go about their lives. In order to effect this 
synthesis, I appeal to Irving Goffman's most clear and impactful works, The Presentation 
of Self in Everyday Life (1959) and his later work Stigma: Notes on the Management of 
Spoiled Identity (1963). 
 Before continuing any further – it is important to define carefully what I do not 
mean by invoking the discourse of the closet. I do not in any way mean to make the 
suggestion, one that resides in the not-that-distant past, that non-heteronormativity should 
be pathologized or medicalized in any sense. Nor am I making the case that queer 
identities are a disability. There are certainly limitations to the analogy, and I will take a 
moment to explore them here. First, it must be said that this way of speaking about illness 
and disability is not an innovation - other scholars have engaged in projects of "queering 
disability" (Claire 1999; Samuels 2003; McRuer 2003) and using the one to speak about 
the other (Swain & Cameron 1999; Shakespeare 1996; Garland-Thompson 1997; 
Wendell 1996).  And second, I acknowledge that "such analogies often create and rely on 
artificial dichotomies that not only produce inequality between the terms of comparison 
but exclude or elide anomalous experiences that do not fit easily within their terms" 
(Samuels 2003:235). I have tried my best to avoid this.  
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A Third Space 
 
 
 Goffman (1963) describes two paths of stigma: the discredited, and the 
discreditable. The discredited is always already exposed, and therefore passing or 
closetedness is not possible for them. The discreditable, however, do not appear as they 
otherwise are. Thus we can easily locate those with non-apparent disabilities within the 
realm of the discreditable. There are two identities at play, one "virtual" and the other, 
"actual." Virtual is what persons appear to others to be, and actual is what they really are. 
It is the discrepancy between these two that potentially generates stigma (3). Because 
individuals are presumed to be healthy (and heterosexual) unless proven otherwise 
(Swain & Cameron 1999) it is here that we can pinpoint the closet. 
 The most useful way to explore the dynamics of the closet is to follow Sedgwick's 
discussion of the Biblical story of Esther.
36
 She uses it to differentiate the features of 
queer outing from another outing –  that of Esther's Jewish racial identity. In so doing, the 
logics of the queer closet are made explicit. The first distinguishing feature is that, once 
Esther outed herself as Jewish, her husband did not question it. There were no appeals 
made to someone else's expertise, no institutional sanctions were required. He doesn't 
suggest that she's just ―going through a phase, or just angry at Gentiles, or could change 
if she only loved him enough to get counseling‖ (79).  
 Outing oneself to close friends or family can always backfire, but without at least 
an attempt at gathering a support system, it makes coming out to others in the wider 
social circle that much harder. If my own father won‘t believe me, who will? If my own 
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spouse thinks I‘m making it up, why should I expect my boss not to think so? And family 
members should not be presumed to be a source of support for the disabled person. 
Considering that they may constantly endure hearing their loved one complain of 
symptoms, or repeatedly be forced to deal with disruptions to the otherwise smooth 
operation of life because of that family member's health failing, it's not surprising that 
people report failed marriages and strained family relationships.  ―In spite of this 
evidence for everyday beliefs about stigma and familiarity, one must go on to see that 
familiarity need not reduce contempt‖ (Goffman 1963:53). Then again, outing to some 
family members may work, but for the good of the family unit it might be expected that 
the knowledge is hidden from others in the family. Then the maintenance of the closet 
becomes a family affair, as awkward questions must be anticipated, covered over or 
fielded. Shame and guilt can arise at anytime. Shame for being a social pariah, and guilt 
that a loved one has to defend you to others because of it.  
 An additional problem is that, if one has successfully managed to out oneself, 
even having provided answers to any instant objections that arose, there is no guarantee 
that this 'out' status will stick. Closets are stubborn. Even if you‘ve come out to someone, 
they can either forget, silently refuse to really believe, or loudly question the veracity of 
your claims. Though 'passing' would seem to spare someone the grief of the outing 
process, people with non-apparent disabilities have no choice in the matter. This is a 
unique relationship vis-à-vis the closet: rather than being able to seek refuge in it, people 
are constantly trying to escape it. The alternative is to give a false impression of being 
able-bodied, and the social consequences for failing to adhere to someone's expectations 
can be very grave indeed. But even announcing one's disability may not be enough; 
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because of the element of non-visibility, the impressions one is giving and the 
impressions one is giving off do not appear to validate each other (Goffman 1963:2). 
 How would one give off the impression that they are indeed disabled? By 
adhering to social norms and expectations: wheelchairs, white canes, guide dogs, etc. 
Failing to do so invites suspicion. ―Knowing that the individual is likely to present 
himself in a light that is favorable to him, the others may divide what they witness into 
two parts; a part that is relatively easy for the individual to manipulate at will, being 
chiefly his verbal assertions, and a part in regard to which he seems to have little concern 
or control, being chiefly derived from the expressions he gives off‖ (Goffman 1959:7). 
There is a paradox involved here. On the one hand, proclaiming oneself to be disabled is 
a powerfully stigmatic claim; why would anyone do this? On the other, a person is 
implicitly asking to be forgiven social sins; they are trying to qualify for empathy – take 
on a role that they do not appear to fill. Claiming a stigma then, becomes a ―favorable‖ 
light. 
 Returning to the story of Esther - a second observation that Sedgwick makes is 
that Esther's husband is completely taken by surprise  by her revelation. Not only that, but 
Esther seems fully confident that she has successfully managed her stigmatizing 
information up to that point. Here the comparison with the queer closet can still hold 
depending upon the context, but not as tightly. While it is true that in "mixed 
interactions" (Goffman 1963:12) people never can be sure who knows about their health 
status, it may not matter because they are not always able to control their comportment in 
such a way that their fatigue or pain is undetectable. Here again, though, the stubborn 
closet returns – polite company does not point out someone's difficulties, and in any case, 
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it doesn't seem that people pay much attention to such indications. After all, they could 
simply be written off as everyday ordinary tiredness or aches and pains. And frankly, 
someone's failed health is perhaps not as salacious or exciting as their sexuality or gender 
identity. It may be impossible to predict which among the gathered company remembers 
or even took it seriously, if you've outed yourself to them in the past.  
 In more intimate settings, such as among family and close friends, the above 
distinctions may no longer hold. It is much easier to discount the outing of a colleague or 
acquaintance than it is one's own daughter, father, spouse, etc. Outing takes on new 
consequences. This is a third observation in the story of Esther: she seems unconcerned at 
the effect her outing might have on her husband; the risk is chiefly to herself, and her 
people.  But it is entirely possible to be stigmatized by association. The ‗sufferer‘ is not 
the only one who suffers. As with coming out in the traditional sense, parents and close 
friends can be devastated. It can mar the closest of relationships. And the impulse to try 
and normalize a loved one is almost certainly the first result; on a certain level this is 
understandable. While it‘s true that they may want to avoid any guilt or taint by 
association, it‘s more likely that a loved one instinctively, if not in any coherent form, 
realizes that stigma, judgment, and misery can come out of this identity ‗choice.‘  
 Thus, trying to bring the stigmatized person back into the fold is a desire that dies 
hard. Years can go by and your uncle might still ask if you‘re over it yet. Are you sure 
you‘ve tried acupuncture? As with effects of queer outing, similar feelings or fears of loss 
that people experience with a 'disability' outing are also at play. Am I never going to have 
grandchildren? Is my son or daughter doomed to never have a serious relationship? Could 
I have done something to prevent this? Did I do something to bring this about? These 
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fears are then often projected onto the other person: If your faith was stronger, you 
wouldn‘t be ill. Have you been to a psychiatrist? What do they have to say? Perhaps 
you‘ll get over it soon. Why are you seeking attention like this?  Have you tried 
acupuncture?  
 But for Esther, she has a base of support through her identity; she ―knows who her 
people are.‖ But the disabled have to scramble; always they must  ―with difficulty and 
always belatedly to patch together from fragments a community, a usable heritage, a 
politics of survival or resistance‖ (Sedgwick 1990:81).  Though there are pride parades 
which make spaces available so that people can finally come together to celebrate their 
non-heteronormative identities, I cannot imagine such a thing as a chronic illness pride 
parade. Without even addressing how ludicrous it would be to celebrate feeling miserable 
most of the time, it would be impossible to schedule a time and date that would be 
accessible for everyone. Because the nature of chronic illness is that it is completely 
unpredictable, scheduling political events would likely result in more guilt and more 
shame for those who couldn't attend. The rest would simply be miserable, as they would 
be unable to manage potential symptoms through control of their own environments in 
ways that they could at home.  
 The final zone of overlap between queer closets and disabled ones can be 
illustrated by Sedgwick's observation that Esther did not, at any time, assume her 
husband was a closeted Jewish person. The possibility of that had simply never occurred 
to her. Contrast this with the havoc that closeted homophobics often wreak upon the 
outed homosexual. Here, too, there is room for comparison. It is so important to 
remember that the experiences of illness vary on an individualized basis. There is nothing 
54 
 
worse than being betrayed by one's 'own kind.' I have a chronic illness, too, and yet I 
could still make that game, finish that article, meet that deadline. Why couldn't you?  
Acupuncture has worked great for me; have you tried it yet?  
 
 
Special Insights, Fieldwork Results 
 
 
 
 
 So far the above discussion has treated the experiences of closetedness in an way 
abstract enough to encompass most, if not all, of those who live with non-apparent 
disabilities. However, I want to move beyond the general to a few particular instances. 
There are innumerable facets to explore at the juncture of embodied experience and the 
mechanisms of social friction, and it would be impossible to describe them all. But there 
are two unique experiences that are so different from my own that I wanted to seek out 
the voices of a few who could enlighten me. Specifically, 1) the experience of being a 
man and non-apparent disabled, and 2) the experience of being doubly closeted: 
possessing both a queer identity and a disabled one.  
 
 My first key informant, who I will call 'Tim,' is an African American man in his 
late 30s. He and his partner, who is white, along with their three young biracial children, 
have been living together for several years. Though she was recently able to complete her 
college education, both of them struggle at low-wage jobs to keep the family above the 
poverty line; they have not gotten married in part because they would lose the 
government benefits that help keep the family afloat. His industrial job requires a lot of 
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heavy lifting and other strenuous activities. He told me that he once tried to calculate the 
average amount of weight that he had to lift or carry at work on a daily basis - it was in 
the thousands of pounds. Pain and fatigue has drastically reduced his ability to work. And 
recently, he started experiencing strange symptoms like pain and tingling in his hands and 
feet.  
 Forced to finally deal with these problems, when he couldn't push through it 
anymore, he paid out of pocket to see a doctor (the family does not have insurance). He 
was diagnosed with Lupus. Even though it isn't a 'contested' illness, and potentially poses 
serious continuing threats to his health, he has experienced resistance at both his job and 
in the doctor's office. When he approached his employer requesting reduced hours, citing 
his Lupus diagnosis, their response was, "Yeah, and?" Tim's doctor mistakenly diagnosed 
his hand pain as Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, and recommended surgery. Though it cost him 
thousands of dollars, Tim proceeded with the surgery. Later he learned that he'd 
developed Raynauds Syndrome, which causes tingling and pain in the hands and feet. 
 In talking with Tim, as he made his children pancakes, I could tell that he 
appreciated the opportunity to speak with someone who could speak the language of 
chronic illness. He didn't have to try and explain what Raynaud's was, and I could easily 
follow his stories about the various medications he'd tried. A quiet man, he seemed to 
become more engaged in the conversation the more I was able to offer indications that I 
understood where he was coming from. The experience of surprisingly overwhelming 
fatigue, the frustration of trying treatments that didn't work or just made things worse - all 
of these things I could understand.  
56 
 
 Even though I experienced a lot of second-hand frustration hearing about his 
encounters with doctors, followed by the inevitable disillusionment with the medical 
profession, I felt honored that he was sharing his stories, and that I could in exchange 
provide some insights that I'd learned from my own experiences. Comparatively 
speaking, Tim is a 'young' chronically ill person; his diagnoses are a relatively new 
phenomenon for him. Through his stories I was reminded of some of my own first steps 
as a non-apparent disabled person. Although I don't know if Tim will apply for disability 
benefits, or keep trying to cling to a job, I do worry about his future health. Though it is 
completely nonsensical, public clinics don't want to treat Lupus until it becomes severe 
and life-threatening. It doesn't have to progress to that point, but it might without the 
proper treatment.  
 I was straight forward about my interest in his story, and asked him what it was 
like dealing with these new challenges as man with a family. Lupus is a chronic illness 
that can be just as unpredictable in severity as CFS or FMS. Dealing with ever-changing 
symptoms have understandably been a source of frustration and worry. He lamented his 
wild younger days; long before he met his current partner he had fathered other children. 
He shared with me his personal regrets and the shame he feels that he struggles to pay 
child support for these children from a prior relationship. There is also the additional guilt 
that paying towards the child support would mean putting a strain on the household 
finances. Once strong and carefree, now he has to try and hang on as best he can while 
also dealing with his reduced capabilities and confusing new symptoms.  
 The experience of men living with chronic illnesses is woefully understudied and 
under-theorized. Then again, men as a category seem to be under-theorized. According to 
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Gutmann (1997), as far as anthropology has been concerned, ―Masculinity is either 
ignored or considered so much the norm that a separate inventory is unnecessary. Then, 
too, 'gender' often means women and not men‖  (403). Chronic illnesses are 
overwhelming gendered as female. And most discussions of chronic illnesses, contested 
or otherwise, begin by stating how much more prevalent it is in women. Many then seem 
to proceed as if women were the only ones affected. But the experiences of chronically ill 
men should not be minimized. Some work on masculinity has suggested that men's 
identities are not mapped primarily on their bodies as male, but instead are enacted: 
―there is a constantly recurring notion that real manhood is different from simply 
anatomical maleness, that it is not a natural condition that comes about spontaneously 
through biological maturation but rather is a precarious or artificial state that boys must 
win against powerful odds‖ (Gilmore 1990:11). Masculinity hinges on a man's ability to 
'be a man' and to act like one.  
 Kathy Charmaz (1994) provides one of the few pieces of research on chronically 
ill men. Her study utilized interviews of around 40 men, and 40 women, and then 
compared the two for differences in how they dealt with the identity shifts that took place 
when they became chronically ill. Rather than focusing on long-term chronic illness, 
most of the discussion centers around men who had experienced a sudden break in their 
lives due to a serious illness, and then had to learn to live in altered circumstances. Men 
frequently referred to their break in health as akin to a ―mid-life crisis‖ (272).  Charmaz 
found that men, unlike women, more often strive to recapture their pre-illness selves, 
something that invariably results in failure and depression (279).  
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 Men also did not feel the same relief when receiving the legitimacy of a 
diagnosis; instead, they ―glossed over‖ the potential seriousness or meaning of their 
symptoms. Part of this difference can be accounted for by the fact that men ―seldom had 
trouble in getting practitioners to attend to their developing symptoms‖ (273). Charmaz 
concludes that men try to either resurrect their former selves, or at least appear to be the 
same as they were; they see their illness as a battle to be won, and failing this, they may 
give up and fall into deep depression, ending up with a high risk of suicide. Considering 
the stakes, it is imperative that men's experiences of disabling illness do not continue to 
go unstudied. 
 The second illness narrative that I received came in the form of an online chat 
interview. A 21 year old white woman, NK 
37
 reached out to me on a social networking 
site. As both queer and disabled, she offered to provide her insights on how the closet 
analogy seemed to her, based upon her own experiences. She explained that her first 
‗outing‘ had been at 13 years old, when she revealed to her parents that she was queer. 
Her chronic illness outing happened later, but neither experience went well. She had 
presumed that the health revelation would be met with overwhelming support from her 
family, something that she had witnessed when an extended family member was 
diagnosed with cancer. This did not turn out to be the case. It might, in some respects, 
have been due to her medical history of having received psychiatric care. Her estranged 
biological father suffers with mental illness, as do many of those on his side of the 
family. And as fate would have it, in her early teen years she began to experience various 
behavioral and mental difficulties. Her exposure to the ‗medical gaze‘ began young, so 
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she had been receiving psychiatric treatment long before her FMS symptoms started. On 
the one hand, she was able to bypass the initial stage of having to prove her new 
symptoms were psychosocial in origin, but on the other, she had to learn all too quickly 
to deal with the impacts of illnesses that others don't see. ―I missed so much school that I 
was taken to court for truancy, because I‘d exceeded my number of absences that could 
be excused, even with a doctor‘s note. I was put on two years of probation for that.‖ 
 Calmly, and matter-of-factly (or so it seemed to me, even though it was through 
online chat), 
38
 she added that she‘d once been date raped, gotten pregnant, and then had 
a miscarriage. This experience added PTSD to her collection of things to manage. She 
also related how she had had to give up her dream of becoming a zookeeper. For a time 
she actually worked with zookeepers and loved it. It was doubly depressing when she'd 
had to finally quit because as far as she was concerned, the people she'd worked for at the 
zoo had essentially raised her. But alas, at the time she'd been dealing with cognitive 
symptoms similar to narcolepsy, and had no choice but to move on.  ―Zookeeping can 
literally get you killed, even if I was working with fairly manaegeable animals.‖   
Because of her long history of being on medications, she apparently was able to 
get access to new medications to help with her FMS symptoms. ―They‘d started 
experimenting with medicating me right out of the gate, so the actual diagnosis [of FMS]  
felt a bit superfluous by the time it came.‖  After she experienced a bad reaction to taking 
Lyrica, then the only medication marketed as a treatment for FMS, the doctor 
inexplicably doubled the dose. Her young life has been full to the brim with less than 
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pleasant doctor-patient encounters. Even with pain, fatigue, and other neurological 
symptoms, she was counseled by one neurologist to simply ‗try harder.‘ ―Neurologists 
are the biggest dicks of the medical world. I think they find themselves fancy.‖ 
After establishing her medical history, more or less, the chat turned to the topic of 
the queer closet as an analogy to discuss life with non-apparent disabilities:  
NK: It‘s a very similar process, the conversations you have with families and employers, 
and hell, even medical professionals, because it‘s fairly common for queer folks in 
the closet to end up seeing a therapist at one point or another, because that lifestyle 
will drive you crazy.  
Me: What has been more problematic for you personally? Do you get more support or 
understanding about one identity over the other? 
NK: Definitely the physical aspects. They require a bit more from other people, and a bit 
more effort to hide.  Not that hiding your sexuality is easy or enjoyable, but it 
involves some tricky pronoun work, explanations, etc., and not as much direct need 
for accommodation from the people you‘re trying to hide it from.  I don‘t know that 
I got more support/understanding, but I was certainly given less grief about coming 
out as queer. That was kind of a flash in the pan, everyone is very upset about it, and 
then, if it‘s not right in front of their eyes, they tend to ignore it or justify it away, ―a 
phase.‖ 
Me: Do you find that being ill is ever like that? Do people need ‗reminding‘ because you 
don‘t ‗look‘ any different? 
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NK: Oh yes. There‘s this ugly catch-22, this impossible balance to find. On the one hand, 
you can be very open with the fact that you‘re having problems. I‘m tired. My joints 
hurt. I can‘t do that because I‘m having trouble with x,y,z. And yes, then people are 
aware of it. But because it‘s chronic illness, not acute, they get reeeaaallly tired of 
hearing it. So then you‘ve got the other hand, the one where you don‘t say anything. 
You try to continue on the best you can, but of course, there are still limitations. And 
so when you hit a serious roadblock and have to say ―I can‘t do this,‖ they tend to be 
a bit surprised and confused. ―Where is this coming from?‖ And then there‘s a lot of 
eye rolling. 
 
 The experience of a double-bind is the defining feature of the 'third space' 
between the healthy and visibly impaired. Staying in the closet has consequences just as 
outing does. Even though she was adamant that the two identities caused similar social 
problems, it had never occurred to her to think of them this way until I pointed it out. I 
was very curious as to why that might be, so after much awkward prefacing on my part, I 
finally asked NK why she had never considered the similarities of the queer and disabled 
closets. She replied that the medicalization paradigm is so powerful, so engrained, that 
she simply never thought of it that way. And, she observed, ―You don‘t have to lobby for 
people to do anything for you when you‘re queer as you do for accommodations.‖ 
 It seemed to me, though I could be flattering myself, that the comparison was 
ultimately an empowering one for NK. Her replies seemed to come in a shade quicker 
than during other segments of our live chat conversation. As we continued to discuss the 
mechanics of the closet, I think the both of us realized that the comparison allowed us to 
verbalize the stigmas we'd felt in a way that society might actually understand. This was 
62 
 
my initial hope when I first considered the analogy, but since NK lives both the identities 
of queer and disabled, it was an enormous relief for me to know that she too found it 
helpful, instead of offensive or gratuitous.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
  To say that someone is disabled in some way is not simply to say that he  
  or she cannot do something, or some set of things: it is rather that he or  
  she cannot do things that the speaker supposes individuals of that kind are  
  supposed to be able to do. 
39
   
 
 
 
 
 
 This thesis has sought to shed light on some of the obstacles that people with non-
apparent disabilities must constantly navigate. Choosing when and how to out oneself as 
disabled is a constant concern with ramifications for family, work, and broader social life. 
Living with an ever-changing chronic illness is like standing on shifting sands; day to day 
life consists of struggling to function with fatigue, pain and other challenges while also 
attempting to perform one's various social roles. It is often an isolating experience, and 
made more so by the lessened legitimacy of embodied claims to suffering. In attempting 
to explain an insufficiently clear diagnosis to new doctors, friends, and others, many 
people find that the narratives of experts are in a much more authoritative position than 
their own to make claims about their bodies. Whether the experiences of suffering are 
alternatively defined by appeal to psychosocial factors or to broader sociopolitical and 
economic inequalities, the voice of the patient is frequently lost.  
 Utilizing the works of Goffman and Sedgwick has hopefully underscored the fact 
that the dynamics of stigma management and of the closet intertwine in unique ways. The 
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story of this closet is also a story of the double-bind: in trying to  succeed, each move you 
make also causes you to fail. At the crux of the problem is the choice between the lesser 
of two stigmas; once a person's level of functionality degrades to the threshold of 
disability, the stigma of outing oneself as disabled may be less impactful than the stigmas 
associated with failing to adhere to social norms for no apparent reason. We are 
presumed healthy unless proven otherwise (Swain & Cameron 1999), and the 
expectations for the able-bodied are both formidable and increasing as more and more 
productivity is expected of us (Martin 1994; 2009). 
  In failing to perform to these expectations the moral judgments imposed upon 
one's character can be harsher than the stigma that comes with the 'disabled' label. Even 
though outing comes at a high cost for the 'invisibly' disabled and is often a process that 
must be endlessly repeated, the stakes for not maintaining this stigmatic label can be 
quite high.  In this way, stigma itself can become a goal to be achieved rather than a 
status to escape. Further, the label itself can open up paths to desperately needed 
accommodations and social safety nets. Even so, people who suffer 'invisibly' still 
struggle with guilt and shame for claiming this status, because the dominant cultural 
paradigm of the disabled is still so predicated upon the model of the visibly impaired.  
 One of the most interesting insights gleaned from my survey results was that even 
though 100% of the 29 respondents would describe themselves as chronically ill, and a 
majority evaluated the level of their illnesses as disabling, only 10 people were totally 
confident that they were in fact 'really ill' and not just somehow lazy, or not trying hard 
enough. In addition, though everyone conceded that their illnesses seriously affected their 
ability to do major life activities like going to the grocery store, most would still feel 
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guilty about using a disabled parking tag, even if it would significantly help them to 
perform these life activities. The paradigm of the visibly, predictably, even 'healthy' 
disabled is a very, very powerful one.  
 But whether advocacy or 'visibility' increases, for the chronically ill there will 
always be day-to-day suffering until biomedicine can come up with better answers for 
what's going on with contested illnesses. There is a brisk business in holistic and 
alternative treatments for symptoms, and some people have found substantial relief this 
way. Many lay theories abound to explain the etiologies of chronic illnesses, and as such 
there are a multitude of strategies for affecting cures. Biomedical legitimacy for contested 
illnesses, therefore, can be seen as ultimately a means to an end. It is less a way for the ill 
to 'make sense' of their illness, nor is it necessarily a project to reify a philosophical 
concept of the mind/body split. Instead, it is chiefly a pathway to better treatments, and 
possibly some relief.  
 It is, then, essential that care providers and others also understand that the 
common initial resistance of patients to consider psychiatric or psychological pathways to 
treatment is not a refusal on their part to acknowledge that stress or depression can affect 
their bodies, but instead is a reaction against a long history of physicians displacing 
blame onto patients for their suffering. Without this understanding, people may be 
reluctant to seek treatment from their doctors for the depression or anxiety that 
necessarily attends being disabled and having to learn to live life in a drastically different 
way. The goal of the practitioner and the patient should thus be united towards the relief 
of suffering.  
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 To make one last point: People who are not forced into the third space of non-
apparent disability might be justified in wondering why it's so important for us to receive 
a social pass for failing to adhere to unspoken social norms, when the norms themselves 
are unfair and should really be questioned in the first place. Because it hurts other people 
besides ourselves. Yes, discrimination should be a thing of the past, but it's not. And if 
people don't realize what they are doing is discriminatory, they are probably only paying 
attention to the fact that you've disrespected them, betrayed their trust somehow, or that 
you don't want to spend time with them. Not only, then, have you hurt other people, but 
you are in the position of being unable to promise it will never happen again.  
 And despite the guilt, and then the shame, you can't help but also feel helpless and 
angry against perceptions of you character that you cannot change. ―When we think of 
those who present a false front or 'only' a front, of those who dissemble, deceive, and 
defraud, we think of a discrepancy between fostered appearance and reality‖ (Goffman 
1959:59).  In my particular case, no one sees the mandatory 12 hours of sleep (that's half 
my life), the slow tortured climb out of bed, the 5 times I change clothes because I 
haven't been able to do laundry recently and I can‘t make a decision on what to wear, the 
speeding ticket that I almost get trying to make it on time, the three square meals that I 
haven‘t eaten today, or the daily handful of expensive pills that I have to take. But instead 
of my own story, I will let NK have the last word. When I asked her if she had anything 
to share that might help others to understand her situation, she shared the following: 
 I think they need to understand that people live differently. Not everyone has the 
 same abilities opportunities, and options as they do. And that trying to 
 compensate for that (gay marriage; ensuring accessibility and accommodation, 
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 government aid in the form of SSDI/Medicare/SNAP) is not ―special treatment.‖  
 This is something that has been fought across decades, centuries, political 
 factions, and cultures. It‘s not new. And it still sucks.  
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Appendix: Survey Questions 
 
 
Survey title: Living with Non-Apparent Disabilities 
 
 
[These substantive questions appeared after the initial ―Basic Demographics‖ section] 
 
 
Would you describe yourself as living with a chronic illness? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Unsure, but probably 
o Unsure, but probably not 
 
Please choose the option that most broadly describes your illness: 
o Mood disorders & other cognitive disorders (Bipolar, ADD/ADHD, etc) 
o Chronic pain or other ―diagnoses of exclusion‖ (Fibromyalgia, Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome, etc) 
o Auto immune disorders (Lupus, Celiac, Lyme disease, etc.) 
o Other (Please describe)  
 
Do you have access to health insurance? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I did, but not anymore 
o Yes, but only recently 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with a chronic illness? 
o Yes 
o Yes, but I don‘t agree with the diagnosis 
o No 
o No, but I think I should have  
 
If you would like to elaborate on your answer to the previous question, you may do 
so here: 
                  [text box] 
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[This next section asked respondents to rate each statement on a five-point scale from 
―Very true‖ to ―Not true at all‖] 
 
 
My health negatively affects my ability to perform at work or in school. 
 
My health makes it difficult to make plans for the future. 
 
People are surprised to hear that I am chronically ill. 
 
I often hear, ―But you don‘t look sick!‖ or similar phrases. 
 
I often feel pressure to prove to other that I am ―really sick.‖ 
 
Even if I were issues a disabled parking tag, which could significantly improve 
my ability to get around or run errands, etc., I would still feel guilty using it. 
 
I often wonder if I could try harder, or I worry that my problem is actually 
laziness. 
 
My close friends and family are generally supportive and understanding about my 
health challenges. 
 
My colleagues and/or coworkers are generally supportive and understanding 
about my health challenges. 
 
My boss (professor, teacher, etc.) is generally supportive and understanding about 
my health challenges. 
 
My doctor or health care provider is generally supportive and understanding about 
my health challenges. 
 
I sometimes agonize over the need to ―confess‖ or explain my health status to new 
friends or acquaintances in order to avoid potentially being judged later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This was the final question of the survey] 
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According to Sec. 12102 of the Americans with Disabilties Act (2008 [1990]), in 
order to qualify under U.S. law as “officially” disabled (for purposes of protections 
under the law, including possible benefits) you must have: 
 
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an 
impairment.” 
 
Furthermore, it states that: 
 
“An impairment that substantially limits on major life activity need not limit other 
major life activities in order to be considered a disability.” 
 
and also: 
 
“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would 
substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 
 
 
Based solely on this definition, would you consider yourself “officially” disabled? 
o Yes. 
o No. 
o Maybe. 
 
 
 
 
 
[end of survey] 
 
